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A Contextualised Historical Account of Changing Judicial Attitudes to 
Polygamous Marriage in the English Courts 
Abstract 
 
Whilst much of the literature focuses on debating polygamy as a harmful practice, the 
purpose of this paper is to consider a different form of harm by exploring judicial responses 
to this relationship and the women who engage with it. Over the years, the courts have been 
faced with numerous questions on the recognition and regulation of polygamous marriages. 
Commencing with an overview of existing literature on polygamous marriage, I situate and 
explain the postcolonial feminist inspired conceptual framework which underpins my judicial 
discourse analysis of English case law in this area spanning from 1866 to the present day. A 
postcolonial feminist lens exposes the racist, orientalist, imperialist and sexist attitudes 
permeating judicial language in relation to polygamy and its participants. These patterns of 
discourse subordinate women in polygamous marriages, leaving them in a vulnerable 
position. With time, these discourses seemingly fade but through a closer reading of recent 
cases, it becomes evident that they are still present, albeit in a subtler form as a matter of 
public policy, morality and “good”.   
I. Introduction 
In 1866, whilst deciding that John Hyde’s marriage could not be dissolved in English law, 
Lord Penzance asserted that it did not fall under the definition of marriage as ‘understood in 
Christendom’ (p.130).1 Over twenty years later, the marriage of Christopher Bethell to a 
woman of the Baralong tribe in Bechuanaland2 was deemed invalid as it had not been 
formed on the ‘same basis as marriages throughout Christendom’ (p.234).3  Following a leap 
of over 50 years, in Shahnaz v Rizwan4 in which the plaintiff sought to enforce her Islamic 
                                                          
1 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. Hereinafter Hyde. 
2
 Now in present-day South Africa. 
3 In Re Bethell Bethell v Hildyard (1887) 38 Ch. D 220. Henceforth Bethell. 
4 [1964] 3 WLR 759. Hereafter Shahnaz. 
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dowry rights, her marriage was not seen as ‘offensive to the standards of decency accepted 
by the English law,' (p.397) whilst more recently, in ECO New Delhi v SG,5 a child was denied 
entry into the UK because she failed to meet the relevant Immigration Rules criteria. The 
judgment concluded that discouraging her parents’ form of marriage was a legitimate aim to 
pursue the protection of morals. These cases all have one thing in common: they concern 
polygamous marriage.  
In this paper I argue that current judicial attitudes towards women living in polygamous 
marriages in the UK are problematic. This will be shown by applying a postcolonial feminist 
lens to the existing case law on polygamous marriage to observe discursive patterns 
throughout the judgments.  
The discourse analysis method adopted in this paper is inspired by Didi Herman’s (2011) 
arguments surrounding judicial agency. Her research demonstrates that ‘judges are active 
agents in the production of orientalist, racialized and Christian discourse’ (p.20-21). I seek to 
demonstrate that this is also true in relation to polygamous marriage. The best way to 
discover what judges think about polygamy is to analyse what they say and for this reason, a 
discourse analysis is appropriate. Discourse analysis concentrates on instances where 
speech equates to action. A judicial decision is not merely speech but ‘is intended to create 
an action, both in respect of the parties in the instant case and, where applicable, in future 
cases…’ (Harding, 2012, p.434). By looking for patterns of discourse within judicial rhetoric, 
we can see what influenced and continues to influence judicial perceptions of polygamy. 
Over fifty English cases were read and analysed, all of which were electronically reported.  
                                                          
5 [2012] UKUT 00265 (IAC). 
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The paper commences with an exploration of existing literature on polygamous marriages, 
women and the law to explain the utility of a postcolonial feminist inspired lens. 
Postcolonial feminism disrupts dominant discourses and places practices and situations 
within their historical context. Feminist scholars use these insights to further contemporary 
understandings of polygamy by disrupting the dominant discourse that polygamy is harmful 
in itself. Disrupting this discourse then paves the way for an expansion of the harm debate 
to look for other sources of harm affecting women in polygamous marriages.  Additionally, I 
consider research on contemporary English legal responses to polygamous marriage which 
shows that the current legal framework is problematic, leaving women and children to 
suffer. 
I then discuss the two concepts of orientalism and imperialism, drawing on existing 
scholarship to demonstrate their relevance. I argue that orientalist thought denies women’s 
capacity to contract polygamous marriages as they are subject to orientalising and othering 
processes which position them and their marriage as inferior. This is manifested in the 
religious Christian supremacy which underscores many judgments as the courts grapple 
with ideals of marriage.  Orientalist Christian supremacy is linked with the imperialist 
civilising mission as religion plays a key role in constructing and dismissing polygamous 
marriage. Debates surrounding the legal recognition of polygamous marriage are steeped in 
imperialist and nationalist rhetoric as the UK seeks to preserve the Christian monogamous 
ideal.  
Following this, I chart the evolution of judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage and 
women who engage in polygamy in the UK. From the analysis, three main arguments arise. 
First that racist, imperialist, orientalist and sexist discourses are present throughout the case 
 4 
 
law on polygamous marriage. Second, these discourses intersect and intermingle to affect 
women in a negative manner. Third, judicial language has evolved so that in more recent 
times, these themes are still present but are not longer as explicit. 
II. Polygamous Marriage and Women – A Postcolonial Feminist Approach 
In this section, I provide a critical overview of the scholarship on polygamous marriages, 
women and the law, demonstrating how existing research has inspired the postcolonial 
feminist conceptual framework underpinning this paper.  
Patriarchy, History and Postcolonial Feminism – A Conceptual Framework 
Much of the research conducted on legal responses to polygamous marriage is centred on 
its harms. For example, Thom Brooks (2009) argues that greater harms are attached to 
polygamous marriage for women because it is structurally inegalitarian in practice and 
theory. He explains that polygamy is practically inegalitarian because it is rarely 
polyandrous,6 leaving women without the opportunity to engage in polygamy in the same 
way as polygynous husbands. In addition, polygamy is theoretically structurally inegalitarian 
because although a polygynous husband can divorce any of his wives at will, the wives may 
divorce him but not one another. As such, they may be bound in a relationship with another 
wife against their wishes. These two issues lead to the conclusion that polygamous 
marriages are incapable of existing outside of a patriarchal framework. Bhikhu Parekh 
(2010) adds to this by arguing that polygamous marriages are more harmful because 
                                                          
6 Polyandry denotes the form of polygamy in which one wife is married to multiple 
husbands; polygyny is the term used for polygamous marriages involving a man married to 
multiple wives. 
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spouses feel ‘dispensable’ (Parekh, 2010, p.287), whilst monogamous marriages provide a 
better prospect of spousal equality.    
At first glance, the assertion that inequality and patriarchy underlie polygamy, does not 
seem especially controversial until it becomes evident that monogamy is inherently 
positioned as the ideal non-patriarchal and egalitarian model of marriage (Beaman 2014). 
Gillian Calder (2009) questions the reality of this ideal arguing that patriarchy transcends 
familial structure and to assume otherwise is naïve. This critique exposes the unfair 
treatment suffered by women in polygamous marriages based on the flawed assumption 
that patriarchy is exclusive to their form of marriage. In addition, the idealised construction 
of monogamous marriage is damaging to monogamous wives as the harm and patriarchal 
attitudes that they experience may be downplayed. 
Whilst developing her thesis on minimal marriage, Elizabeth Brake (2012) questions whether 
‘marriages within religious traditions that subscribe to gendered spousal roles [should] be 
deprived of recognition’ (p.199). She further examines the harm arguments by undertaking 
a more contextualised comparison between monogamy and polygyny in the ‘small 
patriarchal religious communities within which polygyny tends to be located in the United 
States’ (p.198). In finding that polygamy’s ‘problematic features are not sufficiently different 
in kind from existing male-female monogamy to justify differential treatment…’ (p.200), 
Brake therefore demonstrates the importance of context to determine that the influencing 
factor on harm and gendered roles in these communities is patriarchy. 
In other work, Joanna Sweet (2013) examines the abuse suffered by women and children in 
Canadian polygamous marriages concluding that ‘patriarchy (as evidenced in the extreme 
form of polygyny) is harmful’ (p.18). In her exploration of the 2010-2011 Reference 
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regarding s.293 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which considers the constitutionality of 
Canada’s prohibition of polygamy, Sweet (2013) also finds that the Reference does not 
‘delve into the extent to which patriarchal monogamous marriage creates gender inequality’ 
(p.18). She concludes that it is the manifestation of patriarchy which is harmful, thereby 
aligning her critique with Calder’s (2009) and Brake’s (2012) assertion that patriarchy is the 
real concern.  
The work on patriarchy and harm in polygamous marriage has inspired the choice of a 
postcolonial feminist conceptual framework for two main reasons relating to the disruption 
of dominant discourses and historical consciousness. I view postcolonialism as an 
‘intellectual movement’ (Woo, 2011, p.92) focussing on critiques of colonisation which 
situate postcolonial as a label for the study of colonial practices and their consequences. 
Postcolonial feminism explores the intersection of colonial critique and gender to consider 
the effects of colonisation on women. Gayatri Spivak (1999) observes that colonised women 
are essentially constructed as brown women who need white men to save them from brown 
men. This serves as a starting point for understanding the characterisation of women in 
polygamous marriages and the harms that they suffer in English law. The mentality that 
brown women still need saving persists today as evidenced by the discourses surrounding 
other practices including the hijab.   
After decolonisation, many women have used the hijab to make a political statement and 
declare their resistance to colonialist narratives which portray them as oppressed and 
forced to hide (Yeğenoğlu, 2003). Through this resistance, women use the veil to disrupt 
colonialist discourses which provide them with a white saviour (Chow, 2003). Thus, a 
postcolonial feminist lens serves to expose gendered and colonialist narratives in legal 
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judgments which can then be disrupted or questioned. In doing so, steps can be taken to 
interrogate the assumptions and attitudes which govern approaches to polygamy in the law 
(for further discussion see e.g. Lewis and Mills (eds.), 2003 and Vakulenko, 2012). The utility 
of such discursive disruption is further evidenced by the feminist scholarship on polygamous 
marriage outlined above. By exposing the presence of harm and patriarchy in monogamous 
marriages, the argument that polygamy is inherently harmful is successfully disrupted, 
informing my analysis of judicial discourse. 
The second reason that I have adopted a postcolonial feminist approach concerns historical 
context. Jane Haggis (2003) refers to postcolonial feminism as a ‘feminist historical project’ 
(p.163) and scholars in this branch of feminism use the past to better understand and 
question the present. Kaganas and Murray (1991) illustrate the effectiveness of historical 
consciousness by grounding their analysis of South African polygyny in colonial history. 
Referring back to the ‘ethnocentrism of white colonizers’ (Kaganas and Murray, 1991, p.125) 
facilitates a more nuanced deconstruction of legal approaches to South African polygyny, so 
that prevailing attitudes can be problematised. The use of history to contextualise the 
development and presence of colonial discourse is effective in advancing contemporary 
understandings of case law as legal judgments, especially those on marriage, are shaped by 
prevailing social attitudes (Probert, 2012). This provides a clearer picture of the current 
situation and how the courts have arrived there, enabling us to challenge contemporary 
judicial attitudes towards polygamy in English law.  
It is also pertinent to consider some of the research investigating attitudes to polygamy in 
English law in the postcolonial context. For example, Prakash Shah (2003) looks at the 
vulnerability of individuals in polygamous marriages in the UK and concludes that outlawing 
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polygamy drives the practice underground. Shah attributes the rise of polygamy and its 
presence in the courts, to Asian and African immigration into the UK, thereby showing the 
importance of paying heed to context. He engages in a thought-provoking and historically 
conscious analysis of the existing English legal framework, arguing that the current system 
remains unsatisfactory. Adopting a legal pluralism approach, he ultimately asserts that 
individuals engage in polygamy outside of official law and in failing to recognise this and 
adapt accordingly, women and children suffer the most. Shah limits his analysis of the law to 
the areas of immigration and family reunion and there is little evidence of engagement with 
feminist legal critiques. However, this piece is useful as it highlights the implications for 
women in polygamous marriages of current legal and judicial attitudes to this practice.  
Building on this, I can then move towards exposing the underlying influences and views 
which impact upon and subordinate women in this area. 
Adrien Wing (2011) has also been active in researching polygamy using a global critical race 
feminist approach in the UK. Wing expands critiques of polygamy to consider the broader 
socio-legal dynamics which shape and influence the legal framework with reference to 
polygamous families in Black Britannia. Along with insights provided by Shah, I use her work 
to examine legal and judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage in the UK through a 
critical postcolonial feminist lens, thereby improving understandings of how the law 
responds to women who practise polygamy and why it responds in this manner. 
Investigations into colonialist influences on polygamous marriage also uncover patterns of 
orientalist and imperialist thought which bear consideration. Drawing again on the existing 
research on polygamous marriage I shall now explain the interpretation and use of these 
two closely-linked concepts. 
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Orientalising Discourse: Personal Agency and Religious Supremacy 
Edward Said (2003) defines orientalism as a discourse which encompasses dealing with the 
Orient and authorising views of it. There has been much debate over defining the Orient but 
I argue that the Orient encompasses both the Arab and Asian world and simply comprises 
nations which are not considered part of the West.7 Due to its exotic and different nature, 
the West deals with the Orient by forcing it into a western paradigmatic model which it 
cannot fit into because of its differences (Said, 2003). This difference is held as evidence of 
the Orient’s inferiority providing colonisers with knowledge which they would then use as a 
source of power to exercise over the backward colonial natives (Lewis, 2000).  
Critiques of orientalist behaviour in the law are effective in highlighting orientalism as a 
source of the western supremacy which drives imperialism and the white colonialist saviour. 
Teemu Ruskola (2002-2003) studies orientalist influences on the Chinese legal system, 
arguing that the West claims an ‘ultimate interpretative authority’ (p.234) over laws and 
legal systems in the Orient. Here, we can see orientalism at work with western observers 
claiming superior knowledge over the laws of an “other” oriental nation. Interestingly, 
orientalist “knowing and othering” processes permeate contemporary studies of 
polygamous marriage. Beaman (2014) notes that attitudes towards polygamy are 
constructed around an “us” (monogamists) versus “them” (polygamists) approach and this 
manifests in the lack of legal recognition for polygamous marriage. Looking for patterns of 
                                                          
7 Defining the ‘West’ is also plagued with difficulties. Alastair Bonnett (2004) argues that 
there are strong links between the desire to find a non-contentious alternative to what was 
once called ‘Christendom’ and the rise of the idea of the West. I use the West as a way to 
describe predominantly white nations with Christian-influenced values and institutions.  
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orientalist thinking in the case law on polygamy enables us to understand how and why 
polygamy has been “othered” using western monogamy as the comparative standard. 
Another theme in the polygamy literature related to “othering” is concerned with the 
agency of women. In her work on Mormon polygamy and religion, Rebecca Johnson (2014) 
observes that women are portrayed as lacking in agency when making the decision to enter 
into a polygamous marriage as ‘a powerful social narrative presumes [their] consent to have 
been coerced…’ (p.110-111). Women are subject to orientalist assumptions regarding their 
agency to make the right decision about their marriage, rendering their decision-making 
abilities inferior to women in monogamous marriages.  
Johnson (2014) adds a religious dimension to her critique with her “coercion presumption”, 
providing the basis for examining religious orientalism in legal responses to polygamous 
marriage. Although not universal, many women participate in religiously sanctioned forms 
of polygamy, indicating the utility of exploring the position of religion in judicial decision-
making. Johnson (2014) challenges legal responses by asserting that by assuming religious 
women lack the agency to be in a polygamous marriage, their beliefs are dismissed as 
‘displaceable by logic’ (p.111). This indicates a presumption of inferiority for religions which 
provide for polygamy, showing the pervasive nature of orientalist attitudes towards this 
non-normative form of marriage. 
Imperialist Ideals: National Values and Legal Recognition 
Another useful concept for analysing judicial approaches to polygamous marriage is British 
imperialism. Imperialism has close ties to postcolonialism because it is related to Empire-
building and colonisation. Robert Young (2001) states that imperialism provides the 
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motivation for the physical process of colonisation and Wolfgang Mommsen (1981) expands 
this to make two key arguments which underpin my use of imperialism. He first asserts that 
white supremacy stems from ‘biological and racial variants of national imperialism’ (p.8) and 
should therefore be included within understandings of imperialism; and second that 
imperialism may also be an objective process which results in the civilised coloniser taking 
necessary control of a backward society. By including biological and racial characteristics, 
the close connection between imperialism, racism and white supremacy is displayed, 
indicating the importance of noting the role of these latter two concepts in judicial 
understandings of polygamy. 
Mommsen’s second argument regarding the civilising mission has become increasingly 
prominent in more contemporary definitions of imperialism and the reason for this 
evolution is attributable to decolonisation. Colonisation constitutes the most recent form of 
Empire-building on the basis of imperialist thought and among others, Thornton (1961-
1962) asserts that colonialists never saw themselves as exploiting colonies but mainly 
viewed themselves as ‘trustees of civilisation’ (p.335). Thus, colonisation was for the benefit 
of colonised nations and peoples.  
Exposing the “civilising mission” mentality has been expanded in the research of critical 
scholars including Lila Abu-Lughod (1998). Although not explicit, I noted a connection in her 
work between the imperialist civilising mission and current ideas of modernity. The term 
‘backward’ (Mommsen, 1981; Harshé, 1997) is frequently used to describe culture and 
society in former colonies and this word indicates a need to bring them forward into the 
present. When something is updated, it is modernised and so, modernisation is a newer and 
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more politically correct term for civilisation, with the same objective that I identify as 
western imitation. 
The notion of western imitation is helpful for understanding judicial discourses surrounding 
polygamy because, as we shall see, marriage is also constructed in accordance with western 
monogamous ideals. By looking for imperialist tropes within judicial discourse, the 
disruption of dominant colonialist narratives can be broadened to include imperialist ones. 
By uncovering and questioning both colonialist and imperialist discourses within these 
judgments, the effects of colonisation and western supremacy on attitudes towards 
polygamy in the English courts can be investigated further. 
It is noteworthy that existing research highlights the nation-state and its interests as a bar to 
legal recognition for polygamous marriage. Critiques of imperialism aid in confronting the 
use of national interests and Margaret Denike (2010) provides insight into this when she 
considers race and polygamous marriage in Canada and the US. She observes the historical 
connection between nationalist sentiments and marriage noting that ‘anti-polygamy 
campaigns were deeply implicated in the alignment of normative sexual monogamy and 
racial Anglo-Saxonism within the imperial logic of the nation-state’ (Denike, 2010, p.868). In 
charting racist and imperialist patterns of thought in these campaigns she interrogates the 
denial of recognition for polygamous marriages and the preservation of a national 
monogamous identity. Sweet (2013) also addresses these ideas in her critique of Canadian 
nation-building discourses, concluding that the monogamous marriage ideal is viewed as 
essential for upholding national values and women’s equality.  
In addition to religious orientalism, imperialist critiques of religion and the role of 
Christianity are useful for evaluating the English case law on polygamous marriage. Inherent 
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in the civilising mission is a sense of religious conversionism (Curtin, 1972). For natives to 
become fully civilised, they must follow the most civilised religion: Christianity. Christianity 
was seen as an essential facet of life in the West and colonial natives would never be truly 
civilised until they had converted to this religion. As civilising has become modernising, 
conceptions of Empire have become more secular in nature, but the influence of religion is 
still a real concern, particularly in relation to marriage and the law. In applying a critical lens 
which looks for undercurrents of Christian imperialism in judicial attitudes towards 
polygamy, we can challenge the Biblical ideal of marriage as monogamous.  
Existing research on polygamous marriage provides a variety of interesting perspectives and 
critical examinations of this practice in the law. By drawing from and combining the insights 
of the existing scholarship, I am able to demonstrate that applying a postcolonial feminist 
lens to the case law on polygamy proves effective in promoting a deeper analysis and 
understanding of the influences and discourses that shape and affect legal responses to 
polygamous marriage and women who live in such marriages in the UK. 
III. Constructing Polygamy – Racism, Imperialism, Orientalism and Sexism in the 
English Courts 
The case law discussed in this part, starts during the height of British imperial rule with Hyde 
v Hyde and Woodmansee8 in 1866, moving through the 20th century and finally into the 
present day. From the analysis, three main arguments arise. First that racist, imperialist, 
orientalist and sexist discourses are present throughout the case law on polygamous 
marriage. Second, these discourses intersect and intermingle to portray polygamy in a 
                                                          
8 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. Hereinafter Hyde. 
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negative manner and subordinate women who are living in polygamous marriages. Finally, 
judicial language has evolved with time so that in more recent times, the themes of 
discourse identified are no longer explicit. However, they still remain prevalent in the case 
law, albeit in a subtler form based upon considerations of ‘public good’ and legitimate aims 
for protecting certain interests.  
(I) Late 19th Century – Hyde and Bethell 
The first case on polygamy which bears consideration is Hyde.9 Here, the husband who was 
a former adherent to the Mormon faith, sought to dissolve his marriage to the respondent 
wife on the ground of adultery. The marriage had been solemnised in Utah in accordance 
with Mormon requirements. Once the husband petitioner had left the Mormon faith, the 
wife married another man in a Mormon ceremony. The question for the court was whether, 
due to the petitioner’s English domicile, the marriage would be considered valid in English 
law so that jurisdiction could be established and the divorce petition granted. It was held 
that the marriage was not valid for the purpose of enforcing any duties or granting relief for 
breach of matrimonial obligations. 
This case provides a starting point for polygamy as it was during the course of determining 
what constituted a marriage in English law, that Penzance LJ decided a legally recognised 
marriage could not be polygamous: 
‘A marriage contracted in a country where polygamy is lawful between a man 
and woman…is not a marriage as understood in Christendom…the English 
matrimonial court will not recognise it as a valid marriage…’ (Hyde, 1866, p.130)  
                                                          
9 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
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An English court could not dissolve a Mormon marriage which never existed in English law 
and no distinction was made between potentially and actually polygamous marriages: both 
remained unrecognised. Potential polygamy relates to unions which are ‘celebrated under a 
system of law permitting polygamy, [but] the husband may choose not to exercise his right 
to take a second wife’ (Lord Collins of Mapesbury with Specialist Editors, 15th edn, 2012, 
p.965). Such a marriage is therefore de facto monogamous, but due to the potential for it to 
be lawfully polygamous under the law under which it was celebrated, it is viewed as being 
potentially polygamous. The other category of actual polygamy is more straightforward as it 
constitutes ‘a marriage in which the husband has exercised his right to take a second wife 
during the subsistence of the first marriage’ (Lord Collins of Mapesbury with Specialist 
Editors, 15th edn, 2012, p.965). Throughout Hyde10 there are various examples of imperialist, 
orientalist and patriarchal statements. For example, during the course of the judgment, Lord 
Penzance defines marriage in the following terms: ‘I conceive that marriage, as understood 
in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others’ (Hyde, 1866, p.133). The emphasis on 
“Christendom” indicates the dominance of Christianity in shaping understandings of 
marriage,11  illustrating the courts’ imperialist commitment to Christianity as the ideal for 
civilised marriage at the time, when faced with any form of polygamy.  
This definition has been criticised by contemporary scholars as unrealistic even in 1866. 
Rebecca Probert (2007) draws on the work of Sebastian Poulter (1979) to assert that 
Penzance LJ’s statement is fundamentally flawed. Marriage is not always lifelong as divorce 
                                                          
10 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
11 See page 13 above. 
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decrees were granted even prior to Hyde12 and it would be difficult to determine the 
meaning of ‘voluntary’ both in 1866 and today.13 Monogamy is not guaranteed, as infidelity 
provides a ground for divorce and so, even if two parties have contracted the marriage, 
further parties can be involved. Gillian Calder (2009) takes this forward to note that the only 
element of the definition which ‘remains firm’ is that parties marry ‘to the exclusion of all 
others’ (Calder, 2009, p.74). Thus, marriages which unite more than two parties are still 
excluded from understandings of marriage.  
In addition to this Christian supremacist discourse, there are myriad examples of orientalism 
and patriarchy as demonstrated in the passage: 
‘There are no doubt countries peopled by a large section of the human race in 
which men and women do not live or cohabit together upon these terms…In 
such parts the men take to themselves several women, whom they jealously 
guard from the rest of the world, and whose number is limited only by 
considerations of material means. But the status of these women in no way 
resembles that of the Christian “wife.” In some parts they are slaves, in others 
perhaps not; in none do they stand, as in Christendom, upon the same level with 
the man under whose protection they live.’ (Hyde, 1866, p.133-134) 
Said’s (2003) abovementioned definition of orientalism, included the notion of “authorising” 
views of the Orient based on western assumptions. The language of certainty employed in 
this excerpt through phrases including ‘no doubt’ and ‘in some parts they are slaves…in 
                                                          
12 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. See eg Warrender v Warrender (1835) 2 Cl & Fin 488. 
13 Steps have been taken to address the “voluntary” element in the forced marriage 
framework. See s.121 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
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none do they stand...’ provide evidence for this. Lord Penzance’s confident and assured 
opinion orientalises and dismisses polygamous marriage because it does not fit within his 
understanding of the Christendom ideal of marriage. 
The remainder of the passage exemplifies the intermingled Christian supremacist-
patriarchal rhetoric to which women in polygamous marriages were subjected at the time. 
For example, unlike a Christian wife, the women in this scenario are not seen to be on the 
‘same level’ as the man that takes them. This idea of being on the same level is encouraging 
at first because it suggests that a Christian wife could enjoy a level of equality with her 
husband. However, when read in conjunction with the words: ‘with the man under whose 
protection they live’, traditional gender roles become visible once more. This statement is 
self-contradicting because a woman cannot be on the same level as a man if she needs to 
live under his protection. The very notion of male protection instantly places a woman in a 
weaker and more vulnerable position, displaying the rampant sexism in judicial discourses 
which not only relate to women practising polygamy but also to the Christian wife. This 
discourse exemplifies Rebecca Probert’s (2007) argument that rather than defining 
marriage, Hyde14 should instead be seen as a defence of marriage in 1866 which was shaped 
by its context. During this time, women were viewed as weaker and it is unsurprising that 
they were constructed in such patriarchal terms. Nevertheless, when combined with the 
imperialist and orientalist superiority displayed towards women in polygamous marriages, a 
hierarchy remains in which the Christian wife holds a higher value.  
This passage also feeds into the debates discussed earlier surrounding women’s agency. In 
the judgment, polygamous wives are portrayed as lacking the protection of an English 
                                                          
14 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
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husband which can only be enjoyed by the Christian wife. Drawing on Spivak’s (1999) theory 
of the white male saviour, this exemplifies the mentality that polygamously married women 
need to be saved from their marriage. The judgment proceeds to state that ‘in some parts 
they are slaves’ indicating a loss of agency and personhood. As slaves, these women are 
constructed as incapable of deciding the form of marriage that they engage in. This supports 
Rebecca Johnson’s (2014) orientalist presumption of coercion, thereby illustrating how 
Christian imperialism justified the denial of recognition for polygamy when combined with 
the orientalist gaze.  
More than twenty years after Hyde,15 little had changed in the courts’ attitude as 
demonstrated in the case of Bethell.16 This case dealt with the de facto monogamous 
marriage between an English domiciled man and a woman named Teepoo, of the Baralong 
tribe in Bechuanaland. Their marriage was celebrated according to Baralong custom and 
was held invalid in English law because Baralong marriage does not confer the same status 
on the parties as Christian marriage. As such, Teepoo and her child with the deceased could 
not be recognised as heirs to his estate. The judgment also had stronger racist undertones 
than Hyde17 which involved parties who were both white and living in the West. Peter Fryer 
(1984) explains that ‘[f]rom the 1840s to the 1940s Britain's ‘native policy' was dominated 
by racism. The golden age of British Empire was the golden age of British racism too’ 
(p.165). As colonised natives, the approach to the Baralong, in line with native policy, was 
focussed on their inferior race.  
                                                          
15 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
16 (1887) 38 Ch. D 220.  
17 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
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Whilst establishing the facts it is stated that the deceased:  
‘went through the form of marriage according to the custom of the Baralong 
tribe with Teepoo, a Baralong girl…; that the Baralongs had not any religion, nor 
any religious customs, and that polygamy was allowed in that tribe…’ (Bethell, 
1887, p.221)  
The reference to religion or lack thereof and its connection to polygamy is an example of 
Christian imperialism and orientalism. There is no indication of how this assessment was 
reached that the Baralong have no religion. In his depositions, the chief of the tribe refers to 
‘Baralong custom’ (p.222) although whether this is rooted in religion or tradition is left 
unclear. The discourse suggests that polygamy can only be countenanced if participants are 
either non-Christian or have no religion, alienating this practice and its participants from 
England and English law.  
Elsewhere in the judgment, the Baralong are portrayed as a ‘barbarous or semi-barbarous 
tribe…beyond the limits of the British dominion’ (Bethell, 1887, p.232). This is the first 
overtly racist discourse in the judgement and stems from the imperialist and orientalist 
notion that as the tribe is living beyond the British dominion,18 and outside the reach of the 
civilised British authority, it must be ‘barbarous’. To characterise a people in this way is 
dehumanising and insulting because to be barbarous, is to be uncivilised; cruel; coarse and 
unrefined (R.E. Allen (ed.) 1990). Such racist discourse supports Mommsen’s (1981) 
arguments regarding the use of racial and biological differences to bolster and underpin 
white supremacy and imperialism. At this time, the inferiority of a colonised people was 
                                                          
18 I treat this as a synonym for British Empire.  
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based on “scientific evidence” linking physical characteristics to intellect and morality in 
what Fryer terms the ‘pseudo-scientific mythology of race’ (p.165). Due to the Baralong 
being ‘barbarous’; having no religion; and permitting polygamy, their racial and religious 
differences were highlighted and used against Teepoo and her child by the racist, imperialist 
native policy at the time to deny them lawful recognition and a share of the deceased’s 
estate.  
(II.) Mid to Late 20th Century – Secularity and Western Imperialism   
By the mid-20th century some noticeable change in judicial attitudes becomes apparent. 
There are no longer any explicitly racist overtones in judgments and from the 1940s 
onwards, we start to see a shift in judicial discourse. Although The Marriage Act 1836, 
introducing the secular option of civil marriage was passed prior to Hyde,19 judicial decisions 
were still based on Christian ideas of marriage. During this period, the judicial discourse 
adopts more of a secular tone but Christian ideals remain prevalent alongside western 
imperialism and orientalism. In addition, the courts start to respond differently to actually 
and potentially polygamous marriages. 
One of the earliest indications of attitudinal change is found in The Sinha Peerage Claim 
case.20 This decision was different because the courts were willing to view potentially 
polygamous marriages celebrated in accordance with the law of a land which permitted 
polygamy as valid in English law. In this judgment concerning an Indian Hindu marriage, Lord 
Strickland refers to ‘religious toleration throughout the Empire’ (p.225) which suggests the 
                                                          
19 [1866] L Rev 1 P & D 130. 
20 HL Deb 12 December 1935, vol 99, cols 224-32.  
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underlying reasons for this shift could be attributed to a developing tolerance towards 
Hinduism and its adherents in the British Empire. However, the word ‘toleration’ is limited 
in scope and denotes reluctance. Wendy Brown (2008) scrutinises tolerance, arguing that it 
is a ‘token of Western supremacy’ (p.182), centring the West as the standard for civilisation. 
Applying Brown’s (2008) insights to this case, it is apparent that toleration remains a tool for 
orientalism. Other non-Christian religions and their practices will be tolerated but there is 
no room for full acceptance.  
Despite the increasing decline of the British Empire,21 the elevated status accorded to 
Christian marriage continues into the 1950s and 60s through the use of certain key words in 
case judgments. When discussing polygamous relationships, terms including “union” and 
“association” are used instead of “marriage”, creating a clear distinction between 
acceptable Christian marriage and all other non-Christian relationships. In Matthew Olajide 
Bamgbose Appellant v John Bankole Daniel and Others Respondents,22 the appellant claimed 
to be the lawful nephew of the deceased who was being prevented from inheriting all of an 
uncle’s estate by the deceased’s children from his nine customary Nigerian actually 
polygamous marriages. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal used the word ‘union’ to describe 
both Christian monogamous and polygamous marriages although it is then stated that ‘the 
courts of Nigeria attached to monogamous and Christian marriages a sanctity not accorded 
to polygamous unions by native law and custom’ (p.112). Thus, the descriptor of ‘union’ was 
used in the context of discussing the Nigerian courts’ approach to these two types of 
marriage, suggesting an imperialist racialised response to the court system in colonial 
                                                          
21 E.g. India gained independence from the Empire in 1947. 
22 [1955] AC 107. Hereinafter Matthew. 
 22 
 
Nigeria along with Nigerian conceptions of marriage. There is a sense of approval for the 
imperial-administered courts as they are implicitly compared to the native law which would 
have been addressed in the native courts (Falola and Heaton 2008). Thus, polygamy is 
distinguished from monogamy on the same colonial judicial platform that native law (and its 
native judges) is distanced from the colonial administration.  
A few years later, a further shift is noted in Shahnaz.23 In this dowry case for an Islamic 
marriage celebrated in India, polygamy is instead referred to as an ‘association’ (p.398) 
thereby discursively distancing polygamy from marriage even further: 
‘The reason I think is one of policy, of morality as conceived first in the mid-19th 
century but surviving into modern times, that nothing should be done to blur the 
distinction between Christian marriage – marriage properly understood…and, on 
the other hand, polygamous associations more resembling concubinage or 
slavery.’ (Shahnaz, 1964, p.398) 
Between Matthew24 and Shahnaz,25 views of polygamy have deteriorated as manifested in 
this descriptive change to ‘polygamous association’. Whilst ‘union’ still retains a sense of 
people coming together or uniting, ‘association’ is further removed from ideas of intimacy. 
It is possible to consider ‘union’ as a personal relationship but ‘association’ has more 
commercial and impersonal connotations.  According to the Christian imperialist view, a 
union or association can never equate to the social and religious institution of marriage. The 
                                                          
23 [1964] 3 WLR 759. 
24 [1955] AC 107.  
25 [1964] 3 WLR 759. 
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relationships entered into by adherents of other religions are therefore inferior and 
undeserving of the same level of recognition. The reasons for this deterioration are not 
clear, especially since there is a gap of under two years between the cases. It may either be 
down to the personal views of the presiding judge or to an overall shift in ubiquitous views 
of polygamy. Regardless, in excluding polygamy from understandings of marriage, its 
inferiority is reinforced whether it is labelled a union or association. This then combines with 
the orientalist assumption that Christian marriage is the only form of marriage that is 
‘properly understood’ as a matter of ‘morality’, thereby indicating that only those who have 
grown up with Christianity in the West can conceive of a proper marriage. Sexist discourses 
are further apparent in this passage as women in polygamous marriages are equated with 
‘concubinage or slavery’. This pattern of thought is steeped in imperialist rhetoric as these 
“brown” women were clearly established as slaves or concubines who required saving. Such 
a portrayal is subordinating to women in polygamous marriages as the courts subject them 
to the degrading status of a concubine or slave who is associated or united with a man, 
rather than lawfully married to him.  
Although there are multiple problematic discourses in Shahnaz,26 progress was made 
regarding overall responses to polygamy. In this case, a woman’s contractual right in 
personam to the promised dowry from her potentially polygamous marriage was enforced, 
supporting the notion that such a marriage was ‘not unlawful’ (p.391). However, the court 
was careful to ensure that it was not the potentially polygamous marriage or any right 
arising from it which could be enforced but the dowry right from the contract the woman 
                                                          
26 [1964] 3 WLR 759. 
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entered into in contemplation of the marriage. It is likely that the de facto monogamy here 
aided the court’s subtle, but cautious change in viewpoint. As explained by Judge Winn: 
‘Nor do I see any foundation in any of the decided cases that have been brought 
to my notice for any judicial ruling that that marriage involved any element 
offensive to the standards of decency accepted by the English law.’ (Shahnaz, 
1964, p.397) 
Judges were now willing to entertain claims related to potentially polygamous marriages as 
by conforming to a de facto monogamous structure they were no longer deemed 
“offensive” or unlawful. In addition, Winn J was cognisant of the difficulties that women 
who are party to a ‘Mohammedan marriage’ face after coming to the UK declaring that:  
‘…it is better that the court should recognise in favour of women who have 
come here as a result of a Mohammedan marriage the right to obtain from their 
husband what was promised to them by enforcing the contract and payment of 
what was so promised, than that they should be bereft of those rights and 
receive no assistance from the English courts.’ (Shahnaz, 1964, p.401–402) 
This sympathetic policy statement is demonstrative of the progress made by the courts to 
adopt a proactive attitude towards the rights of women in potentially polygamous 
marriages celebrated overseas. It could also be attributed to the courts becoming more 
accustomed to seeing such cases, as immigration from polygamy-permitting colonies into 
the UK became more prevalent (Shah, 2003). This in turn led to a willingness rather than 
outright dismissal to hear these women and their issues.  
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That being said, the colonial saviour theme is also prevalent in this statement, reflecting a 
persistent lack of development in cultural perceptions of gender. The suffering of women 
who come here is attributed to their ‘Mohammedan marriage’ rather than the courts’ 
attitude to that marriage. This constitutes a protection narrative, in which the court protects 
a potentially polygamous wife by enforcing her rights. Pathak and Rajan (1992) argue that 
such discourses of protection disguise power politics as ‘[a]n alliance is formed between the 
protector and protected against a common opponent...[which]…conceals the opposition 
between protector and protected, a hierarchical opposition that assigns higher value to the 
first term’ (p.263). This alliance and its protection come at the price of othering the wife by 
blaming her relationship and the new problems it has created for the law.  
Further into the 1960s and 70s another theme relating to entitlement to public money arose 
in the late 1960s which is still relevant today. In this area, individuals – mainly women and 
children living in polygamous families – were deemed an unacceptable burden on the state. 
The courts have sought to protect state funds from abuse by those in polygamous marriages 
as shown in Imam Din v National Assistance Board.27 Here, a man abandoned his second 
wife and their children in the UK, leaving them destitute and reliant on the National 
Assistance Board for financial provision. It was held that there was no good reason to deny 
recognition to the wife and children as being lawfully related under Pakistani law to the 
deserter husband so that he could not ‘avoid all responsibility and thereby throw the whole 
burden of maintaining his wife and children upon the public’ (Imam, 1967, p.218). As 
Salmon J stated: ‘I can find no such reason, and every reason in common sense and justice 
why they should be recognised’ (Imam, 1967, p.218). Recognition of this polygamous 
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marriage prevented the use of public money and forced a man to take responsibility for his 
second family, whilst also implying that that the maintenance of the polygamous wife and 
children is a burden on the state.  
The court’s attitude stems from the privatisation of responsibility for welfare that is at the 
heart of the neoliberal state in the UK today. Whitehead and Crawshaw (2012) explain that 
as a result of neoliberalism, societal institutions are now expected to function as ‘business 
corporations whose rationale is profit generation’ (p.233). As such, the line between the 
public service and private sectors has become increasingly blurred. In Imam,28 recognition of 
the polygamous marriage negated state responsibility for the welfare of the wife and 
children, placing the burden on the husband, but also placing this family in a vulnerable 
position. Even with a legal order, there was no guarantee that the husband would take 
financial responsibility, leaving this woman and her children at the mercy of a man who has 
previously refused to fund their needs. In addition to this vulnerability, the wife has been 
treated undeserving of aid by the state because of her polygamous marriage. To save state 
funds, the court created a gap between the provision of state aid which was denied to them 
and private aid for which there was no guarantee of payment leaving the woman and 
children in an untenable situation of uncertainty and financial insecurity.  
This was contrasted against Nabi (Ghulam) v Heaton (Inspector of Taxes)29 which dealt with 
the income tax relief of a man who had two subsisting Pakistani polygamous marriages and 
could only claim relief for the maintenance of his first wife.  It transpired that the husband in 
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Imam30 had deserted his second wife after the death of his first wife and so he had only one 
living wife at the time of the desertion. The court recognised the marriage because although 
it may have been polygamous at its inception, following the death of the first wife, the 
marriage became de facto monogamous.  
In the period between these two cases, the Law Commission published its 1971 report on 
polygamous marriages, leading to the enactment of the Matrimonial Proceedings 
(Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972. This report departs from the reasoning in Imam31 to 
opine that the wife’s lack of entitlement to social security benefits was: 
 ‘…unfortunate and anomalous… [because she] …should be treated just like any 
English wife is she was in fact her husband’s only wife throughout their period of 
residence in England’ (Law Commission, 1971, p.42).  
This statement exposes the key source of suffering for women in polygamous marriages: 
judicial interpretations of their marriage ensure that they are treated differently and to their 
detriment. This differentiation is an orientalist othering process in which the courts deny a 
woman social security relief because she and her marriage are different from their 
monogamous ideal. Unfortunately, the Law Commission’s opinion had little effect on later 
case law as evidenced by the later Nabi32 judgment.  
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During the Nabi33 decision, whilst interpreting the meaning of ‘his wife’ in s.8(1) of the 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, Vinelott J stated ‘it seems to me to read the 
expression “his wife” as meaning “a wife” or “any wife” would be to do too great violence to 
the language of the section’ (Nabi, 1981, p.1058). The word ‘violence’ is troubling as it 
connotes an extreme reaction to the inclusion of polygamous wives within the scope of this 
provision. In Vinelott J’s opinion, including polygamous marriage would cause significant 
harm on par with physical damage to the section. This choice of words is reminiscent of the 
strong language used nearly a century earlier in Bethell.34 In both cases, there is a feeling of 
disturbance at the thought of polygamy and even though the much earlier Bethell35 
judgment is more explicit, the statement in Nabi36 demonstrates that these patterns of 
intolerant discourse are still present.  
By recognising the two marriages to prevent the husband claiming two lots of tax relief, the 
court had a clear agenda of preserving and protecting state funds. This could harm the 
second wife as the recognition of her polygamous marriage deprived her husband of a tax 
benefit linked to her maintenance which remained with respect to the first wife. The second 
wife was disadvantaged and both her financial security and position were affected. The 
decision impressed upon her that as a second wife, she was not worthy of the same status 
as the first wife and her husband would not benefit from their marriage as much as he does 
from his first, leading again to financial loss and a sense of inferiority.  
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 [1981] 1 WLR 1052. 
34 (1887) 38 Ch. D 220. 
35 (1887) 38 Ch. D 220. 
36 [1981] 1 WLR 1052. 
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The message of inferiority running through these two cases is both orientalist and 
patriarchal. The wives have been othered and subordinated through their depiction as a 
burden on everyone because their polygamous marriage is not suited for the welfare state’s 
construction and regulation of marriage. When compared to the much earlier Bethell,37 it is 
also noteworthy that whilst judicial attitudes towards recognition have evolved, the courts’ 
aim remains the same at this stage: to deny relief and assistance to polygamous wives and 
their children. The problematic discourses surrounding polygamous marriages are still 
present in the case law at this stage and are negatively impacting upon women who engage 
in polygamy.  
(III.) Late 1990s – Potential for Progress? 
As we move closer to the present day, the courts appear to be more accustomed to dealing 
with polygamy. During this period, the statutory framework also developed to reflect the 
judicial tolerance for potentially polygamous marriage with s.5(1) Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions Act) 1995. As a result of s.5, potentially polygamous marriages are 
now not automatically void unlike actually polygamous marriage. 
The case law further indicates a willingness to protect the interests of individuals in 
polygamous marriages. For example, in R v Department of Health Ex p Misra,38 the two 
widows of a doctor who were both lawfully married in India, were equally entitled via extra 
statutory concession to a pension under Reg 14(1) of the National Health Service 
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(Superannuation) Regulations 1980.39 Consequently, the existing pension amount was 
divided equally between the two wives. No additional support was to be given to one over 
the other and even if one wife were to pass away, her share would not be given to the other 
wife.  
Misra40 is a fascinating development in the recognition precedent because the marriages 
were held valid for the purpose of awarding pensions to both widows. There was no agenda 
for protecting monogamy or preventing the abuse of public funds and the rights of these 
polygamous widows were recognised and upheld so that ostensibly they may benefit. The 
courts are generally more focussed on the money rather than the polygamous wife claimant 
but they are still willing to uphold her interests provided there is no conflict with state 
interests. There is no explicit reasoning for the superannuation scheme providing for 
polygamous widow pensions but delving into NHS history provides some explanation. Snow 
and Jones (2011) state that a national shortage of doctors by the 1960s led to overseas 
recruitment from former British colonies. In recruiting such a large proportion of staff from 
nations with a history of polygamy, the NHS could have expanded the scheme as an 
incentive to accommodate immigrant personnel. This case is significant because it shows 
that the courts are capable of dealing with polygamous marriage without being openly 
sexist, racist, imperialist or orientalist.  
                                                          
39 This provides for the entitlement of a widow to an ‘annual widow’s pension’ and is 
supplemented by reg 9 of the National Health Service (Superannuation) Amendment 
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gratuity…provided that such a share…shall not be increased by reason of the death of any 
other wife so entitled.’  
40 [1996] 1 FLR 128. 
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Despite this positive change, another concurrent harmful attitudinal discourse reinforces 
the inferior status of polygamous wives. The two wives here were still penalised because 
one wife’s half of the pension was non-transferable to the other upon death. Thus, unlike a 
monogamous wife, a polygamous wife is only eligible for half a pension, which is damaging. 
The monogamous wife and her marital choice remain privileged and she is rewarded for her 
conformity to the dominant Western paradigm. Polygamous wives are denied access to a 
whole pension, demonstrating the disparity of treatment in the courts based on the 
imperialist perception that a polygamous marriage has a fraction of the value of an ideal 
monogamous marriage.  
Bibi v Chief Adjudication Officer41 continues along this vein of putting state interests and 
monogamy first. Here, the widow of a Bangladeshi Islamic actually polygamous marriage 
was denied any claim to widowed mother’s allowance under s.25 Social Security Act 1975 
and the Social Security and Family Allowances (Polygamous Marriage) Regulations 1975 
because the provisions only applied to the widows of potentially polygamous marriages.  
Interestingly, Ward LJ was persuaded by the argument from the earlier Imam that: 
‘It would clearly be wrong for a man paying contributions on the basis indicated 
to reap benefits in respect of perhaps three or four current wives.' (Imam, 1967, 
p.221) 
Bibi v Chief Adjudication Officer42 concerns a widowed mother’s allowance and as, unlike 
Imam,43 the husband in this instance was deceased, I question his reaping the benefits. By 
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focussing on the man, the widow and her needs were side-lined based on her polygamous 
marriage. Polygamous widows are left to suffer the consequences because the court deems 
it ‘wrong’ to divide their deceased husband’s social security contributions between them. 
Women are again placed in a position of inferiority: they are made to feel like an unfair 
burden on the state because of their non-monogamous marriage. Thus, although some 
progress occurs in Misra,44 polygamous marriages are still being recognised to protect state 
interests and idealise monogamy. This leads to the conclusion that underlying attitudes and 
approaches towards polygamous marriage have changed less than it would seem at this 
stage and are affecting women the same way that Teepoo was affected over a century 
earlier.45 
(IV.) 1990s through to the Present Day – Immigration and Human Rights 
More recently, cases on polygamy have mainly arisen in an immigration context. Judicial 
discourse is less openly imperialist and orientalist, with the courts preferring the “protect 
public interests” approach. As illustrated in the above section, the preservation of 
monogamy is a modernised form of imperialist and orientalist thinking as women in 
polygamous marriages are subordinated by being positioned as a burden on the state. In 
existing research, Beaman (2014) identifies the use of idealised monogamy as the 
comparator against which polygamy is measured and found wanting. Due to their marriage 
running contrary to monogamous ideals, women are orientalised by the assumption that 
their arrival in the UK will be problematic for the state.  
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45 See above at pages 18- 20. 
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Recent cases tend to involve the refusal of entry into the UK for second spouses or children 
from second or third marriages. Polygamous marriages in this instance are not considered 
recognisable for the purposes of granting leave to remain in the UK, but they are considered 
recognisable for the purposes of preventing the entry of multiple spouses. The immigration 
framework refuses to grant a right of abode in the UK to a man’s second wife if his first wife 
is already exercising such a right in the UK and this echoes the focus on polygamous 
marriages to deny legal relief and remedy discussed above in relation to succession46 and 
welfare benefits.47 
This limitation on the number of wives that can claim a right of abode is another imperialist 
and patriarchal method of preserving monogamy in the UK, although the effectiveness is 
questionable because a man is not prevented from having multiple wives abroad. The 
impact of this is illustrated in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Ex. p. Begum (Hasna)48 in which it is stated that the appellant: 
‘…has always lived with her mother in a house which is shared with her brother 
and his family…her brother considers it unacceptable that his sister should be 
condemned to her present life, being separated from her husband. He feels it is 
a matter of shame to his family that his sister has never gone to her husband's 
house to live with him.’ (Begum, 1995, p.1) 
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As a result of her marriage, Hasna Begum was living in a difficult situation away from her 
husband, whilst he lived with his first wife and their children in the UK. The reference to 
‘shame’ is also telling as it unearths another form of harm to women in polygamous 
marriages which is not as prevalent in existing literature. In Part II, I explored the concept of 
harm as a tool to promote negative perceptions of polygamy, with scholars like Kaganas and 
Murray (1991) concluding that patriarchy is the real harm. I situate the applicant’s shame 
for living with her maternal family as a form of harm resulting from patriarchal legal 
attitudes towards polygamy.49 Begum50 shows the consequences suffered by a woman who 
has been legally married in a polygamy-permitting jurisdiction. Despite having official 
recognition in Bangladesh, her refusal of entry left her to live as a single woman supported 
by her brother. It is understandable that a wife would desire to be with her husband in the 
UK and it must be a source of suffering for her to live without him because she has been 
refused entry by the immigration authorities. In addition, the emotional impact of being 
labelled as a source of “shame” for living like this cannot be underestimated.  
Several attempts have also been made to invoke the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in the UK regarding respect for private and family life, the right to marry and the 
prohibition on discrimination. One of the earliest indications of the judicial approach to 
human rights in polygamy is found in Bibi v UK.51 The applicant complained that her right to 
respect for family life was infringed under Article 8 ECHR by the UK’s refusal to allow her 
polygamously married mother into the UK. She also argued that her mother was 
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51 Appl. 19628/92, Bibi v UK (Dec) 29 June 1992. 
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discriminated against on the grounds of sex because her father was allowed to choose 
which of his wives would live with him in the UK.  
It was held that there was an Article 8(1) infringement that was justifiable under Article 8(2) 
because the mother’s exclusion: 
‘…was intended to prevent the formation of polygamous households, the 
practice of polygamy being deemed unacceptable to the majority of people who 
live there.  The aim of the provision would appear, therefore, to be the 
preservation of the Christian based monogamous culture dominant in that 
country.  The Commission considers that such an aim is legitimate and falls 
within the scope of the protection of morals or the rights and freedom of others 
within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.’ (Bibi v UK, 
1992, para 1) 
There was no finding of discrimination as the exclusion stemmed from polygamy for which 
the UK was not answerable under the ECHR. This shows that preserving monogamy is a 
legitimate aim, even at European level and is demonstrative of the pervasive Christian and 
western imperialist ideals which govern English and ECHR legal responses to polygamy. 
Additionally, by situating the aim under the protection of morals, the court indicates that 
polygamy impacts upon public morality. The assumption that public morals would be 
affected is indicative of an underlying imperialist and orientalist message that polygamy is 
only practised by the immoral based on knowledge of the practice from a western 
perspective.  
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A few years later, it was alleged in Khan v UK,52 that the UK Government had infringed the 
A8 ECHR rights of the applicant by refusing his second wife entry when his first wife was 
already resident in the UK. Although the application was deemed inadmissible, the 
Government did argue that the second marriage has not been prevented by UK law in this 
case and the refusal of entry for the second wife is partially justified by the assertion that 
the multiple husbands of a polyandrous woman would not be permitted entry and stay as it 
would ‘not be conducive to the public good.’53  
This is the first mention of polyandry in the case law and there is no explanation or 
justification for the statement made, providing the impression that the state is trying to 
demonstrate an equal approach to both polygyny and polyandry. Interestingly, this case 
represents a shift in attitudes reflecting the consciousness of sex discrimination. Throughout 
the case law, polygamous marriages which have mostly been polygynous have been 
orientalised and held up to western idealised standards of monogamy (Beaman 2014). By 
contrast in Khan v UK,54 a polygyny versus polyandry stance has been adopted to justify the 
refusal of entry for any polygamous spouse. In addressing polyandry, the UK endeavours to 
avoid claims of sex discrimination under Article 8 ECHR, as it would refuse entry to all 
individuals in polygamous marriages regardless of their gender. Thus the authorities have 
changed the comparator from monogamous marriage to sex discrimination. Maleiha Malik 
(2007) explores and problematises the use of comparators in discrimination law, arguing 
that ‘comparison is too individualistic and does not take sufficient account of the social 
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context’ (p.79).  In reality, polygyny is far more prevalent than polyandry and women are 
more affected by judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage than men, indicating that 
this constituted a deliberate strategy to construct a comparator which was harder to 
challenge. 
The phrase ‘not be conducive to the public good’55 is further problematic because it signifies 
the priority given to public interests as the UK Government authoritatively asserts that the 
public would be negatively affected by a polyandrous husband being granted entry into the 
UK. Employing the ‘public good’ justification shows that polygamy is still being othered 
based on orientalist knowledge that it is contrary to the public good. This links with the 
welfare cases explored above where women in polygamous marriages were portrayed as a 
strain on the state because their residence in the UK impacted upon public resources and 
finances. Thus, women in polygamous marriages are constructed in terms of their difference 
to the mainstream version of marriage in the UK and suffer as Hasna Begum56 did.  
Similar attitudes are displayed towards the offspring of polygamous marriages who seek 
entry and stay in the UK.  Entry was denied to the daughter of a man and his third wife in 
ECO New Delhi v SG57 as:  
‘The legitimate aim here is not limited to considerations of numbers alone, but 
to deter the formation of polygamous households in the United Kingdom. Such a 
                                                          
55 (1996) 21 EHRR CD67.  
56 Begum [1995] EWCA Civ J1201-1. 
57 [2012] UKUT 00265 (IAC).  
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policy is well within the state's discretionary area of judgment.’ (ECO New Delhi v 
SG, 2012, para 27) 
These statements echo Bibi v UK58 above, displaying the continued theme of preserving 
monogamy and deterring polygamy. It is legitimate to exclude a polygamous wife and by 
extension her children and the refusal of a child’s entry is therefore tied up with that of its 
polygamously married mother. In keeping with the imperialist theme of preserving 
monogamy, the courts are willing to recognise the existence of polygamous marriage again 
to serve the interests of immigration rather than the desire of the wives and children 
affected.  
Later in the ECO New Delhi v SG59 judgment, Blake J mentions that: 
 ‘…the modest contribution to the discouragement of such marriages in Nepal or 
elsewhere is a legitimate aim in pursuit of morals and the rights of others 
particularly the pursuit of gender equality.’ (ECO New Delhi v SG, 2012, para 47) 
The question of morality and polygamous marriages arises again in this very recent case 
displaying the presence of orientalist discourses in current case law. At several points before 
this statement is made,60 it is stressed that the child was not denied entry because of her 
parents’ marriage but because she failed to meet the relevant criteria in the Immigration 
Rules. This therefore provokes the question of why it was necessary to explain and 
                                                          
58 Appl. 19628/92, Bibi v UK (Dec) 29 June 1992. 
59 [2012] UKUT 00265 (IAC).  
60 See ECO New Delhi v SG [2012] UKUT 00265 (IAC) at paras 28 and 37. 
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commend the discouragement of polygamous marriages ‘in Nepal or elsewhere.’61 The 
authoritative commentary on polygamy and its danger to gender equality is orientalising 
despite existing research showing that patriarchy transcends marital structure.62 Monogamy 
does not guarantee gender equality and to assume so is damaging for all married women. 
These recent immigration and human rights cases continue to perpetuate the same 
problematic discourses which have been appearing throughout the case law for more than a 
century, the only difference being that there are fewer explicit discursive markers. The 
language may have changed but the same imperialist, orientalist and patriarchal influences 
prevail causing women in polygamous marriages to suffer greater harm because of their 
marital status.  
IV. Conclusion 
Over the years, the courts have been compelled to deal with numerous issues regarding 
polygamous marriage. In this paper I explored judicial responses to this form of marriage 
and women living in these marriages, arguing that current judicial attitudes towards women 
living in polygamous marriages in the UK are problematic. A postcolonial feminist lens was 
applied to existing case law to observe discursive patterns throughout the judgments, 
providing insight into the factors which influence English legal responses to polygamy.  
Using existing scholarship on polygamous marriages from several jurisdictions, I explained 
the relevance of an international postcolonial feminist inspired conceptual framework. 
Postcolonial feminism encourages us to disrupt dominant discourses and adopt a historically 
                                                          
61 I interpret this as “everywhere”.  
62 See page 5 above. 
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sensitive approach to polygamy.  In scrutinising legal responses to polygamy through a 
postcolonial feminist lens, the reality of patriarchy as equally harmful to women in 
polygamous and monogamous marriages was exposed, challenging the idea that polygamy 
in itself is harmful. A consideration of historical context, using South African and Canadian 
literature, then uncovered the themes of imperialist and orientalist thought in legal 
perceptions of polygamous marriage. Drawing again on existing research conducted in the 
US to demonstrate their relevance for the judicial discourse analysis, I argued that 
orientalist thought denies women’s personal and religious agency. They are subject to 
orientalising and othering processes which position them and their marriage as inferior. This 
is manifested in the religious Christian supremacy underpinning judicial conceptions of what 
marriage is and should be in the West. Using scholarly critiques of imperialism, I 
demonstrated that orientalist Christian supremacy is connected to the imperialist civilising 
mission as religion plays a key role in dismissing polygamous marriage.  
Building on research on contemporary western legal responses to polygamous marriage 
which note the harms to women in polygamous marriage, I charted the development of 
judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage and women who engage in polygamy in the 
UK. From the analysis, three main arguments arose. First that racist, imperialist, orientalist 
and sexist discourses are present throughout the case law on polygamous marriage. Second, 
that these discourses intersect and intermingle to portray polygamy in a negative manner, 
subordinating and causing harm women who are living in polygamous marriages. Finally, 
judicial language has evolved so that in more recent times, the themes of discourse 
identified are no longer as explicit. However, these attitudes still permeate the case law, in a 
subtler form centred upon considerations of ‘public good’ and pursuing the protection of 
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others. Based on these findings, it is evident that current judicial responses to polygamous 
marriage need to be re-evaluated to address the harms suffered by women based on their 
choice of marriage. 
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